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The paper places Alenka Zupančič’s What Is Sex? in a broader 
framework, in which the Lacanian take on the problematic of being is 
linked with the history of ontology. The psychoanalytic contribution to the 
ontological debates comes down to the difference between Lacan’s 
concept of the real and the traditional philosophical concept of “being 
qua being”. According to Zupančič the real is conceived as a cut in being, 
as that in being, which is “less than being”. Here a thorough 
reformulation of the traditional ontological opposition of being and non-
being is at stake. Although What Is Sex? discusses primarily sexuality 
and the unconscious this focus is underpinned by the problematic of the 
signifier that the paper examines more extensively by distinguishing 
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Primitive Accumulation of Signifiers 
 
At the core of the psychoanalytic intervention in the ontological debates 
stands the “ontological scandal” of the signifier. In some way 
psychoanalysis here seems to go along with Heidegger’s philosophy of 
being, which already reformulated the traditional question of being from 
the viewpoint of the co-belonging of being and language (that Heidegger 
famously describes as the “house of being”).i Alenka Zupančič 
emphasises that from the Lacanian perspective the ontological scandal 
of language consists in the fact that the signifier does not simply 
introduce a cut into some unproblematic and uncorrupted physis, but 
rather seems to emerge out of a pre-existing ontological deadlock that is 
already at work in physis. The signifier thus somehow “translates” the 
instability of “natural being” into the instability of “linguistic being”. In this 
ontological scenario nature and culture are not simply separated by an 
unbridgeable abyss but are instead linked by negativity in the order of 
being, which is itself not being. 
Two passages in Lacan are particularly significant for determining 
the ontological scandal of language. In his responses to the questions 
posed by the journal Cahiers pour l’analyse Lacan addresses the issue of 
materialist theory of language by remarking “the signifier is matter 
transcending itself in language” (Lacan 2001, 209). His reply is also 
explicit about the relation between his theory of language and Marxism: 
“Only for my theory of language as structure of the unconscious can be 
said that it is implied by Marxism, if only you are not more demanding 
than the material implication” (ibid., 208). Lacan’s provisory definition of 
the signifier contains a double rejection, since it is directed against our 
everyday understanding of matter (sensuous ground of reality) and 
language (intellectual tool of communication). By associating matter with 
the signifier Lacan at the same time detaches matter from sensuousness 
and the signifier from abstraction, thus implicitly stating that materialism 
involves a double effort of thinking the material character of abstractions 
and the abstract character of matter. To put it with Marx, what matter and 
language have in common is that they are paradigmatic examples of 
sensuous suprasensuous or gespenstige Gegenständlichkeit (spectral 
objectivity). Matter is already an abstraction and the signifier already a 
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materiality – again, one could hear in this framing a rejection of the 
traditional dichotomy between nature and culture.  
Six years later Lacan makes another peculiar remark in this 
direction: “[N]ature is full of semblances” (Lacan 2007, 16). Rather than 
absenting the signifier, this semblance par excellence, from nature, 
Lacan indicates that we should look at nature as a container of signifiers. 
If nature indeed contains semblances then materialism inevitably 
confronts an ontological complication. It cannot postulate matter in the 
naïve sense of the term, as immediate material ground or principle, since 
this sensuous understanding of matter fails to account for the 
proliferation of semblances in nature, which directly expose the action of 
“self-transcending” or ontological redoubling in “natural being”. Still, there 
is an important difference between the natural and the linguistic 
semblance. The natural semblances do not form a link, they are not 
articulated in a system, which would make of them signifiers for other 
signifiers. In short, the self-transcendence in the natural semblance is not 
yet forming a language.  
What is particularly interesting about Lacan’s remark is that it again 
echoes a Marxian problematic, the so-called primitive accumulation: 
“[W]e do not know how it came, if I may say so, to the accumulation of 
signifiers. For the signifiers, I tell you, are distributed in the world, in 
nature, there are plenty of them” (ibid.). Nature may be a container of 
semblances-signifiers but it does not encompass the action of their 
accumulation. As long as these semblances remain dispersed or “free-
floating” they sustain the self-identity of discourse: “The semblance, in 
which discourse is identical to itself, this is a level of the term semblance, 
is the semblance in nature” (ibid.) – which means that it is not a 
discourse, insofar as discourse always involves accumulation of 
semblances, i.e., mobilisation of their difference, which, however, is 
already build in the natural semblance (otherwise it would make no 
sense to speak of semblance in the first place). The “level of the term 
semblance” that Lacan aims at concerns appearance of reality, similarity 
and even deception, like in the case of animal mimicry and defence 
colours.ii Because on this level “discourse” remains identical to itself, and 
hence does not contain the systematisation and economisation of 
difference it does not point toward an absence. In other words, self-
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identical discourse does not involve action, insofar as the action of 
discourse is conditioned by a lack. For this reason Lacan hints that his 
“meditation” on the presumable self-identity of discourse in the 
semblance of nature is made from the perspective of the non-self-
identical discourse and merely serves as a functional fiction, which is 
supposed to make a point about the problematic status of the 
semblance rather than speculating about an uncorrupted natural state. 
Self-identical discourse would be a discourse, which is not of a 
semblance – and the point of Lacan’s seminar is to show that there is no 
such discourse, first and foremost not on the level of natural semblance 
(in contrast to what Plato argued in Cratylus or what Galileo claimed for 
geometry and mathematics). 
Hence, before hearing in Lacan’s considerations a dubious 
attempt in naturalising language, searching for some presumably lost 
“language of physis” or establishing a positive continuity between the 
natural semblance and the linguistic semblance, it is worth taking his 
thesis on the primitive accumulation of signifiers seriously. For the action 
of accumulation involves both continuity and break between the natural 
and the linguistic semblance. The continuity consists in the fact that both 
semblances are endowed with autonomy and problematise the 
assumption of some uncorrupted “natural being”. But what is not to be 
found in nature, and what primitive accumulation produces, is the 
signifier that Lacan calls the “master-signifier”, a signifier, which stands 
for the non-self-identity of the discourse. In other words, nature does not 
contain a signifier, which signifies the difference at work in the natural 
semblance. In the production of the master-signifier the problematic 
ontological status that already concerns natural semblance becomes its 
privileged materialisation – but it can only obtain it in the systematisation 
of the self-transcendence of the signifier in language, hence in the 
accumulation of semblances.iii 
This is where the “second level of the term” semblance enters the 
picture: semblance as something that, due to the “ontological 
complication” it contains already in nature, virtually implies other 
semblances, a set of semblances, semblance as assemblage. We can 
recognise Lacan’s couple “S1–S2” here, master-signifier and knowledge or 
the battery of signifiers (precisely assemblage), which formalise the two 
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levels of “semblance”, however only under the regime of accumulation 
already intact, hence in language. To be clear again, Lacan’s point with 
regard to the accumulation of semblances is not that the emergence of 
the master-signifier disrupted, corrupted or abolished some natural unity 
but mobilised the ontological deadlock on the level of physis, which was 
implied by the natural semblance, itself not yet embedded in an 
assemblage, not yet forming a distinct set or register of semblances; 
something, which was already an ontological feature of “natural being” 
but did not have any real consequences, because it did not form a non-
self-identical discourse. The accumulation of signifiers produced a 
system of differences, hence Lacan’s earlier “definition” of the signifier as 
“matter transcending itself in language”. In this self-transcendence of 
matter the ambiguity of semblant, similarity and deception, obtained a 
systematic expression, while its problematic ontological status in nature 
underwent a transformation. 
Perhaps this development from natural to linguistic semblance is 
sufficient reason for correcting Lacan’s formula by replacing, or at least 
supplementing, the Kantian sounding “transcendence” with the Hegelian 
“sublation” (Aufhebung) in order to strengthen Lacan’s point regarding 
the accumulation of semblances (insofar as this accumulation is 
constitutive for the emergence of the symbolic system of differences and 
endows semblance with absolute autonomy, which differs from the 
autonomy of natural semblance, its objective appearance in nature, even 
though it stands in direct continuity with it): the signifier is matter 
sublating itself into language. This means that what is articulated in a 
system is not simply natural semblance in its presumable self-identity but 
as ontological peculiarity in nature, which already points toward a 
deadlock in being. It is this ontological deadlock of physis that is 
abolished-elevated in a system, thus making of semblance a 
systematised deadlock or “ontological scandal”. To paraphrase 
Heidegger, language is the house of the ontological deadlock of being 
(in a way Heidegger intuited this ontological deadlock, when he spoke of 
unveiling [Entbergen] and veiling [Verbergen] of being in language). 
 If in the natural semblance discourse is identical to itself this 
means (to refer to Lacan’s remark from Seminar XVI) that it has no 
consequences. Only in assemblage the semblance becomes a cause. 
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When natural semblances begin to accumulate, and moreover, when 
this contingent accumulation reaches a critical point, a transformation of 
semblance takes place, and therefore a transformation of nature from an 
ontologically problematic space, in which discourse had no 
consequences, to an equally problematic space, in which discourse has 
consequences precisely because it stands in direct continuity with the 
“ontological incompleteness of nature” (Žižek) and instability of being. 
Henceforth, the ontological deadlock of nature assumes the form of 
language and begins to speak through the body of the speaking animal 
(parlêtre). However, what is spoken is not the language of sense (or the 
language of the sense of being, to put it with Heidegger) but the 
language of joui-sens (or the language of enjoyment of being, to put it 
with Lacan). The house of being is a factory of enjoyment. 
On the background of this problematic, Alenka Zupančič 's What Is 
Sex? can be read as materialist treatise on the primitive accumulation of 
semblances and the ontological consequences of this accumulation. 
The sublation of matter in language produces a loss and a surplus. What 
appears to be lost is the feature of the signifier, which would sustain the 
self-identity of discourse; what is produced is an addition to the function 
of signifier, its causality, which endows the assemblage of semblances 
with the power of producing real consequences. The sublation of the 
ontological deadlock, signalled by the very presence of semblance in 
nature and its problematic mode of existence in relation to other natural 
beings, amounts to an ontological scandal, which obtains its expression 
in the absolute autonomy of the signifier. This autonomy overcomes or 
abolishes but also transforms and radicalises the autonomy of natural 
signifiers (hence sublation instead of transcendence). The semblance in 
nature is autonomous because it already is objective appearance. But it 
is objective as a sign, sometimes a deceiving sign (like in the case of 
mimicry), but nevertheless a sign. If this sign indeed contains the function 
of semblance, the latter remains “locked” in the sign and does not have 
any signification “for another semblance”. Again, the semblance 
objectifies a deadlock on the level of natural being, which is expressed in 
the ambiguity of natural semblance, namely that it already is appearance 
and deception (Schein). If self-transcendence of matter is part of natural 
being then a problematic difference already stains being qua being. This 
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is the insight from which the ancient materialists and philosophers of 
nature departed from. 
With the emergence of language the ontological deadlock that 
concerns natural being not only begins to articulate in a non-identical 
discourse but it also assumes a subjective form. As soon as semblance 
relates to another semblance it brings a subject of the unconscious, and 
hence a sexuated subject (insofar as sexuality is unconscious) into 
existence. This is how Zupančič frames the transformation in question: 
 
What distinguishes the human animal is that it knows (that it 
doesn’t know). Yet at stake here is not simply that humans are 
aware, conscious of this lack of sexual knowledge in nature; rather, 
the right way of putting it would be to say that they are 
“unconscious of it” (which is not the same as saying that we are 
not conscious of it). The unconscious (in its very form) is the 
“positive” way in which the ontological negativity of a given reality 
registers in this reality itself, and it registers in a way which does 
not rely on the simple opposition between knowing and not 
knowing, between being or not being aware of something. And the 
reason is that what is at stake is precisely not “something” (some 
thing, some fact that we could be aware of or not) but a negativity 
that is itself perceptible only through its own negation. To be 
“unconscious of something” does not mean simply that one does 
not know it; rather, it implies a paradoxical redoublement, and is 
itself twofold or split: it involves not knowing that we know (… that 
we don’t know). This is one of the best definitions of the 
unconscious […]. As Lacan put it, unconscious knowledge is a 
knowledge that does not know itself (Zupančič 2017, 16).iv 
 
This formulation can be extended to the primitive accumulation of 
semblances and its transformation of “self-identical discourse” into non-
self-identical discourse, or transformation of the sign into the signifier. 
What binds humans and animals is lack of knowledge, but what 
distinguishes them is the form, in which this lack is articulated. Animals 
do not know that they do not know, whereas humans not only know that 
they do not know but must deal with the material consequences of this 
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knowledge, which differ from the consequences of the ontological 
deadlock, to which both humans and animals are “subjected”. The 
problematic of enjoyment is intimately related with this primitive 
accumulation of signifiers and the emergence of the master-signifier 
(what Zupančič describes as “one signifier gone missing” [42]; I will get 
back to this crucial materialist point toward the end of this paper). If the 
discussion of enjoyment at a certain point of Lacan’s teaching 
dramatically changed its character (enjoyment was no longer addressed 
from the viewpoint of prohibition but from the viewpoint of imposition) 
this is closely related with his insistence that there is something like a real 
of language that the philosophical tradition hitherto failed to 
acknowledge (or did so only insufficiently). For this reason Lacan’s talk of 
the primitive accumulation of semblances should be taken seriously. The 
existence of language is a sign of an “ontological accident”, which 
produced an unexpected “bonus”, signifier of the loss of signifier (or 
signifier of the lack in the Other). What Zupančič describes as “one 
signifier gone missing” contains as its flipside the production of a signifier 
in excess, one signifier “too much”, which differs from other signifiers 
insofar as it signifies the failure of the function of the signifier and the gap 
in the assemblage of semblances. 
With this vision of primitive accumulation of natural semblances 
and the self-transcendence of matter in language Lacan proposes the 
most radical alternative “fable” to the “pragmatic myth” shared by the 
various philosophies of language, according to which humans “invented” 
language in order to communicate their inner needs, describe external 
reality in an adequate manner etc. This pragmatic myth entirely 
suppresses the ontological scandal at stake in the emergence of 
language and its problematic mode of existence. The myth in question 
also ignores that, if language indeed communicates something, it 
ultimately communicates the dilemma that the speaking being 
experiences in face of (the ontological deadlock of) sexuality and the 
discursive production of enjoyment. For this reason Lacan’s teaching 
progressively moved from the classical structuralist take on the 
autonomy of the symbolic order to the insistence that the symbolic is 
included in the real – whereby the ontological status of this real is as 
problematic as the ontological status of language. Lacan’s move can 
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also be interpreted as a polemic reaction to the theories of performativity, 
which took exactly the opposite direction. If performativity stands for the 
paradigm of discursive action its accounts still miss the real discursive 
consequences, which cannot be brought down to the discursive 
production of reality in terms of manipulable fictions or innocent 
language games. Sexuality and the unconscious are two privileged 
Freudian names for such real consequences, which must not be 
confounded for performative effects. For the theories of performativity, 
too, discourse has no consequences in the real.v 
What is equally at stake in primitive accumulation of semblances is 
the problem of Urverdrängung, primary repression, which makes 
repression appear as productive operation, constitutive for sexuality and 
unconscious, articulated around the lack of the signifier of sexuation and 
around the emergence of the signifier of this lack. Primary repression 
stands for the emergence of the negative force, which holds language 
together. Quoting Lacan, Zupančič reads this emergence as the 
“necessary fall of the first signifier” (11). This does not mean that the 
signifying order comes into existence by losing a signifier, which was first 
there and now has to be searched (in vein). Would this be the case then 
the assemblage of all semblances or signifiers would already have to 
precede the loss of the one signifier in question. Then the loss of one 
signifier would mean as much as the loss of some hypothetical natural 
language, the loss of an authentic language of being, which is now 
corrupted in the errant language of human animal. Rather, the 
“necessary fall of the first signifier” stands for the emergence of disclosed, 
non-all, incomplete and unstable structure, which is “with-without one 
signifier” (48) rather than simply without one signifier. Again, the primitive 
accumulation of semblances involves production of a signifier, whose 
signified is this “without one signifier”. But precisely for this reason the 
“signifier of the lack of signifier” can be considered as a signifier “too 
much”, a signifier in excess. Or differently put, a signifier, which brings to 
the point the constitutive inadequacy of the function of the signifier. Here 
the difference between the semblance in nature and the linguistic 
semblance, master-signifier, signifier without signified, becomes most 
apparent: whereas the semblance in nature still signifies “inwards”, if I 
may say so, the linguistic signifier externalises this “introverted 
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inadequacy”, which testifies of the problematic ontological status of 
natural semblances, and begins signifying for other signifiers. This 
externalisation creates the appearance that an actual signifier was lost or 
went missing and now has to be sought. Speech would then be 
something like an endless Odyssey, an errant quest for the lost signifier 
that was never there. If anything was lost at all it was this inward relation 
of the signifier to itself, the hypothetical self-identity of discourse in the 
natural semblance, which precisely did not constitute a discourse. Put 
differently, if mimicry can be taken as the paradigmatic example of 
natural semblance, with all the ontological complications it entails on the 
level of the imaginary, then language could be described as backfired 
mimicry, imitation of nothing rather than of something. With the 
accumulation of semblances the natural signifier transformed its 
signified: it no longer “signifies” its own paradoxical status in nature to 
itself (which means as much as saying that it ceases to not-signify) but 
the lack of the signifier, thereby bringing a disclosed field of signifiers into 
being. It functions as a magnet for all other semblances in nature and 
articulates them in a system. For the speaking being, in whose body this 
transformation of semblance occurs, now everything in nature obtains 
meaning. The signifier is now indeed encountered everywhere, not the 
natural but the linguistic signifier that the speaking being has great 
trouble distinguishing from the natural semblance.vi All natural things 
seem to point toward a missing signifier, or differently, the emergence of 
language rests on a loss of something, which was never there but which 
nevertheless has real consequences, a productive loss, whose first real 
consequence is precisely language or discourse as constitutively non-
self-identical and efficient.  
In relation to the production of the lack of one signifier all other 
signifiers appear as redundant, superfluous and as surplus. Hence, 
primary repression, insofar as it stands for the production of an efficient 
appearance of a substantial signifier gone missing, sustains the 
constitutive incompleteness of the symbolic order. Again, the loss of the 
signifier does not mean that this signifier was ever there, and if Lacan 
toward the end of his teaching spoke of the necessity to invent a “new 
signifier” (Lacan 1979, 23) this does not mean that he suddenly began 
believing in the existence of the signifier that supposedly went missing 
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and thus fell for his own trick. Even in this framework the loss remains for 
Lacan a productive act, which on the one hand triggers the articulation of 
signifiers in a system, transcendence of matter in language (sublation of 
the deadlock of natural semblance into linguistic semblance), and on the 
other hand functions as a driving force of Lacan’s theoretical endeavour 
– insisting on the ontological scandal of language. The articulation of 
signifiers is driven by the materiality of the lack produced in the process 
of transformation of natural semblances, which do not form a system, 
into signifiers, which form a system under the condition that they are 
moved by a void. This is where the question of matter in a dialectical-
materialist sense of the term – not as sensuous matter but as materiality 
of the cut that assumes real status – becomes most apparent: materiality 
of the lack, hole, void stands at the core of materialism since the 
beginning of philosophy. I shall return to this issue further below. 
 
Language and Ontology 
 
Zupančič 's What Is Sex? engages in a polemic directed against those 
who deny every ontological significance (and thereby any relevance 
whatsoever) to psychoanalysis as well as those who place sexuality and 
the unconscious on the level of discursive performativity. Arguably the 
most influential figure among the latter was Foucault, whose contribution 
to the theories of gender remains indisputable. While Foucault rejected 
ontology and focused on the epistemic production of sexuality, Zupančič 
's What Is Sex? insists that psychoanalysis not only operates with a knot 
of epistemological, political and ontological, but it inevitably introduces a 
political ontology, which gravitates around something in being, which is 
not of the order of being as it was understood traditionally by philosophy. 
Foucault’s opposition between discursive production and symbolic 
repression is hence false, since it overlooks the consequences of 
discursive action, which reach “beyond” the symbolic, while being 
conditioned by the existence of discourse. This is the reason, why What 
Is Sex? is a treatise on dialectical materialism as well as on materialist 
ontology, which in the following I would like to differentiate from two 
other types, metaphorical ontology and metonymic ontology. 
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By making this distinction I would like to pick upon Heidegger’s 
claim that the question of being is inseparable from language, and that 
the oblivion of the “originary question of being” involves the oblivion of 
the exceptional ontological status of language itself. Lacan addresses the 
blind spot of philosophy in quite similar manner when he writes, qu’on 
dise reste oublié derrière ce qui se dit dans ce qui s’entend (Lacan 2001, 
449), the fact that one speaks (enunciates) remains forgotten behind 
what is said (enunciated) in what is heard. Bluntly put, philosophy forgets 
that it speaks, and more precisely, it forgets that speaking is an action 
with ontologically problematic consequences. Again, this does not imply 
the same as theories of performance, in which Heidegger’s linking of 
language and being could be easily translated. In other words, Lacan 
does not say that philosophers have hitherto been blind for the 
performative production of language and mistook performative effects 
for ontological realities.vii Theories of performativity would state that 
language “brings being into being”, i.e., that speech is always 
accompanied by the being-effect and that therefore all being is symbolic. 
To repeat, Lacan’s point is not simply that being stands for the 
performative effect of language that the ontological tradition mistook for 
the “ground of all things”. For Heidegger being already exposed the 
ontological scandal of language, one could even say the real of 
language (which is where Lacan would disagree). Heidegger’s point is 
that as soon as we “remember” the original co-belonging of being and 
language, being turns out to “be” something more or rather something 
different than “being qua being” in the traditional sense. Being is not the 
highest of beings – and this is the confusion that grounds the 
metaphorical ontologies, where being is translated into the metaphor of 
the highest of beings. Lacan, critical as it was toward ontology, made a 
step further by pointing out why Heidegger was not radical enough: 
being contains an internal complication that psychoanalysis addresses 
most notably through the recognition that “there is jouissance of being” 
(Lacan 1999, 70), there is Lust, this privileged Freudian name for a 
discursive product, which is most intimately related to being but not 
homogenous with it. More generally, Lacan’s concept of the real 
addresses the ontological deadlock, from which “being qua being” is not 
exempted but stands in the midst of it: 
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Lacan holds the Real to be the bone in the throat of every ontology: 
in order to speak of “being qua being,” one has to amputate 
something in being that is not being. That is to say, the Real is that 
which traditional ontology had to cut off in order to be able to 
speak of “being qua being.” We arrive at being qua being only by 
subtracting, eradicating something from it. Being qua being is not 
some elementary given, but is already a result which presupposes 
another, previous step. And this step consists not in eradicating or 
suppressing some contradictive positivity, but in eradicating a 
specific, real negativity (contradiction as such). What gets lost here 
is the something in being that is less than being – and this 
something is precisely that which, while included in being, 
prevents it from being fully constituted as being (Zupančič 2017, 
44). 
 
Heidegger may have intuited this “bone in the throat” when he spoke of 
the oblivion of the originary question of being. The entire history of 
metaphysics that Heidegger strived to deconstruct in order to 
demonstrate its repetitive errorviii consists of a series of attempts to think 
being in its pure, uncorrupted state. The entire history of ontology 
involves a fetishisation of being, which turns it into the highest of beings 
by rejecting from being that which is “less than being” – in other words, 
by distinguishing being from language as the privilege mode of its 
unveiling and veiling. In order to constitute itself, philosophy must forget 
that it speaks – it must repress the consequences of enunciation and 
focus only on “what is said in what is heard”. This is the reason why I 
think the traditional philosophical take in ontological matters could be 
described as metaphorical ontology – insofar as the “highest of beings” 
functions as metaphor for “being qua being” and thus privileges 
something that Heidegger (who was anything but immune against the 
logic of metaphor) called the “sense of being” (sense being precisely 
“what is said in what is heard”). Traditional ontology, insofar as it is 
discursively anchored in the metaphor of the highest of beings, must 
forget the ontological scandal of language that is nevertheless brought to 
the point in the very signifier “being”. In contrast, metonymical ontology, 
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which historically predominated with Heidegger’s turn from his early 
fundamental ontology to his mature philosophy of being as well as with 
philosophies of the linguistic turn, whether analytical or continental, and 
with the theory of performativity, recognises in being the privileged 
discursive effect, and thus seems to grasp the ontological scandal of 
language by drawing an absolute equation between being and 
language. But these metonymic ontologies, too, overlook the ontological 
scandal of language, since they remove the real from the overall picture. 
In short, metonymisation of being is not the same as real discursive 
consequences that Zupančič discusses in What Is Sex? 
It should be clear that metaphorical and metonymic ontologies do 
not forget some uncorrupted state of being qua being but rather the fact 
that being, whether considered in the realist or discursive framework, 
originary contains “corruption”. Being is never truly being, or to repeat 
Zupančič 's phrasing, being contains “less than being”, which “prevents it 
from being fully constituted as being” (44). The originary corruption of 
being is what Heidegger intimately associated with the unveiling and 
revealing of being in and through language. The “authentic” formulation 
of the question of being thus concerns first and foremost its constitutive 
inauthenticity, its imposing and subtracting in language, which means 
that being is never truly “presence of the present” but always-already 
involves dynamic, instability and negativity. To put it with an allusion to 
Freud, Sein is Fort-und-Da-Sein. However, such phrasing still remains in 
accordance with metonymic ontology. 
Lacan’s distancing from metonymic ontologies not only involves 
the introduction of the concept of the real, which enables to think 
rigorously “that which in being is less than being”, but also and above all 
to unmask the philosophical discourse on “being qua being” as a specific 
mystification and repression of enjoyment. The flipside of the question of 
being is the problem of enjoyment, and one could add that what 
philosophy overlooks, represses or forgets is that being stands for 
enjoyment of philosophy. Lacan articulates his critique of philosophy as 
the master’s discourse around the insight that “being qua being” is 
corrupted with the “real qua enjoyment”. Being is the object a of 
philosophy, embedded in an exploitative discursive regime, in which 
being stands both for the highest of beings, the ontological master (S1) 
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and enjoyment of being or surplus-being (a) that is added to the 
ontological master. In difference to this ontological master and the 
produced surplus-being the rest of beings (S2) appears in the guise of 
lack-of-being ($).  
Lacan’s first critical move thus concerns the reformulation of the 
question of being through the psychoanalytic problematic of enjoyment. 
From here the second move follows. If it makes sense to talk about 
something like the philosophical oblivion of enjoyment (insofar as 
psychoanalysis reveals, in contrast to philosophy, that “there is 
jouissance of being”ix) this does not imply a pure and uncorrupted origin, 
an originary scene, in which thinking and being would be harmoniously 
the same, but rather a state of constitutive corruptness, impurity and 
antagonism. Again, for psychoanalysis Heidegger’s house of being is 
always-already a factory of enjoyment and the unveiling and revealing of 
being intertwines with the production of enjoyment and reproduction of 
the lack of enjoyment. This is where Heidegger’s renewal of the 
philosophy of being and his return to Pre-Socratics fell short. In addition, 
Heidegger failed to recognise that in the presumably authentic Pre-
Socratic origin of philosophy there is already an immanent split, tension 
between metaphorical ontology (Parmenides), metonymic ontology 
(Heraclitus) and materialist ontology (Democritus). 
From what was said it should not come as surprise that Zupančič 's 
What Is Sex? turns around a triple problematic: sexuality, ontology and 
language, even though the main focus seems to be on the link between 
sexuality and ontology. This triangularisation is brought to the point in the 
mobilisation of Lacan illuminating remark, according to which 
philosophy was hitherto preoccupied with a real, in which discourse has 
no consequences (hence with being qua being), and what needs to be 
thought (what is only worth thinking) is a real, in which discourse has 
consequences – a real, which includes the (real of the) symbolic. This is 
also where materialist ontology distinguishes itself from the metaphorical 
and metonymic ontologies. The following passage from What Is Sex? 
most sharply determines the specifically materialist take on the 
ontological scandal of language: 
 
While the signifying order creates its own space and the beings 
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that populate it (which roughly corresponds to the space of 
performativity […]), something else gets added to it. It could be said 
that this something is parasitic on performative productivity; it is 
not produced by the signifying gesture, but together with and “on 
top of ” it. It is inseparable from this gesture, but, unlike what we 
call discursive entities/beings, not created by it. 
It is neither a symbolic entity nor one constituted by the 
symbolic; rather, it is collateral for the symbolic. Moreover, it is not 
a being: it is discernible only as a (disruptive) effect within the 
symbolic field, its disturbance, its bias. In other words, the 
emergence of the signifier is not reducible to, or exhausted by, the 
symbolic. The signifier does not only produce a new, symbolic 
reality (including its own materiality, causality, and laws); it also 
“produces” the dimension that Lacan calls the Real, which is 
related to the points of structural impossibility/contradiction of 
symbolic reality itself. This is what irredeemably stains the 
symbolic, stains its supposed purity, and accounts for the fact that 
the symbolic game of pure differentiality is always a game with 
loaded dice. This is the very space, or dimension, that sustains the 
“vital” phenomena mentioned above (the libido or jouissance, the 
drive, the sexualized body) in their out-of-jointness with the 
symbolic. 
So: the something produced by the signifier, in addition to 
what it produces as its field, magnetizes this field in a certain way. 
It is responsible for the fact that the symbolic field, or the field of 
the Other, is never neutral (or structured by pure differentiality), but 
conflictual, asymmetrical, “not-all,” ridden with a fundamental 
antagonism (40-41) 
 
Even though metonymic ontologies overcome the confusion of being 
with the highest of beings, they fail to think this “magnetisation” of the 
symbolic, its points of structural impossibility, and consequently, they fail 
to think the real of structure or structure as real. Metonymy (qua 
metonymy of being) is one of the fundamental laws and dynamics in the 
symbolic order. But what interests Lacan, and what makes of language 
the privileged entry point in a materialist ontology, is the persistence of 
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the contradiction in symbolic reality. It is this contradiction that sabotages 
every attempt to reduce discursive consequences to linguistic 
performativity and prevents language to constitute a complete and 
distinct register of human experience, which would either separate 
thinking from the real (what postmodernism claimed) or relate to the real 
in adequate manner (what analytical philosophy claims). Lacan 
expresses the inclusion of the symbolic in the real in the following 
manner: “Structure is to be taken in the sense that it is most real, the real 
itself. (…) In general, this is determined by convergence toward an 
impossibility. It is through this that it is real” (Lacan 2006, 30). For classical 
structuralism – and in this respect it remains a metonymic ontology – 
structure is synonymous with the symbolic; there is no real of the 
symbolic, which would undermine structure from within, just like for 
metonymic ontologies there is no real of performativity, or differently, 
linguistic performativity is not a real discursive consequence: if discourse 
has consequences, the latter are ultimately conceived as performative 
play, language games, metonymy of being etc. Lacan clearly does not 
pursue this line of thought; as he remarks elsewhere with regard to the 
scientific discourse, “it makes the right holes at the right place” (Lacan 
2007, 28; see also Zupančič, 81). This does not mean that natural 
sciences are a meta-discourse. On the contrary, the scientific discursivity 
successfully mobilises something that characterises every discourse, 
including natural language, its “convergence toward an impossibility”. For 
this reason, Lacan insisted that there is direct epistemological continuity 
between physics and psychoanalysis. The unconscious and sexuality are 
two cases, where Freud registered the action of discourse, which 
consists in making the right holes at the right place, or in other words, the 
points, where discourse encounters its own real. 
If the history of philosophy was predominated by metaphorical 
ontology and the 20th century by the emergence of metonymic ontology 
then the recent ontological turn in philosophy seems again to engage 
everyone in a competition in proposing their own version of materialist 
ontology. Still, the various new materialisms, object-oriented ontologies, 
ontologies of active matter, vibrant matter, plasticity, neo-vitalisms etc. 
perpetuate an important weakness of metonymic ontologies, their 
hostility against the notion of the subject, which quickly evolves in the 
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hostility against the unconscious and sexuality and amounts to the 
hostility against (the real of) language. No surprise, then, that these 
“materialist” ontologies have rather poor things to say about everything 
that they are hostile against, or better, their hostility against discourse is a 
sign of the poverty of their materialism. Language is the “royal road” to 
negativity, so it should not surprise if contemporary attempts in 
materialism occasionally amount to a fetishisation, which is as 
problematic as the one at work in metaphorical ontologies, the 
fetishisation of self-affection of matter, which implicitly turns the latter into 
an “automatic subject” (see Nachtigall 2018). Since the dialectical-
materialist take in ontological questions preserves the notion of the 
subject, it remains an outcast. In contrast, what Zupančič calls “object-
disoriented ontology” is precisely an ontology, which reaffirms the 
necessity of the concept of the subject for truly materialist ontological 
inquiries. Only a materialist theory of the subject can prevent ontology 
from spiritualising matter (something that Slavoj Žižek already criticised 
extensively in various new materialisms). In this respect Zupančič’s 
confrontation with the speculative realism indeed brings a crucial 
moment of her book, despite the fact that the philosophical current 
meanwhile lost in its significance and turned out to be precisely what 
many suspected it to be, an instant ontology fabricated for the capitalist 




Zupančič’s discussion of Lacan’s materialism illuminates Lacan’s rather 
problematic notion of antiphilosophy, in which too many philosophers 
heard an insult and too many psychoanalysts a cynicism that they 
willingly reproduce. As Zupančič shows, Lacan’s criticism of philosophical 
discourse contains a decision for dialectical materialism against other 
materialist orientations in ontology. In retrospective this position makes 
the entire history of ontology appear in different light, for Lacan famously 
associated his entire teaching with the foundational tension, which 
exposes the impurity and the conflictuality of the philosophical origins, a 
tension expressed in the contrast between Heraclitus and Parmenides:  
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The fact that thought moves in the direction of a science only by 
being attributed to thinking – in other words, the fact that being is 
presumed to think – is what founds the philosophical tradition 
starting from Parmenides. Parmenides was wrong and Heraclitus 
was right. That is clinched by the fact that, in fragment 93, 
Heraclitus enunciates oute legei oute kryptei alla semainei, “he 
neither avows nor hides, he signifies” – putting back in its place the 
discourse of the winning side itself – ho anaks ou to manteion esti 
to hen Delphos, “the prince” – in other words, the winner – “who 
prophecizes in Delphi” (Lacan 1999, 114) 
 
One Parmenidian error concerns his understanding of the “sameness of 
thinking and being”: if thinking and being are indeed the same then only 
because they both contain the same non-identity. This non-identity is 
linked with the function of the signifier that the Heraclitian fragment in 
Lacan’s quote puts forward: the signifier as the paradigm of non-identity. 
The Oracle of Delphi is said to produce signifiers, which operate on two 
levels, the level of meaning and the level of non-sense. Seminar XX, from 
which the above quote is taken, contains three crucial claims about the 
function of the signifier, which serve as base for Lacan’s critique of 
ontology and which repeatedly show why the elaboration of a materialist 
ontology must encompass a materialist philosophy of language.  
The first feature of the signifier concerns its imperative character: 
“Every dimension of being is produced in the wake of the master’s 
discourse – the discourse of he who, proffering the signifier, expects 
therefrom one of its link effects that must not be neglected, which is 
related to the fact that the signifier commands. The signifier is, first and 
foremost, imperative.” (Lacan 1999, 32) Nowhere else is the imperative 
character better expressed as in the signifier “being”, this philosophical 
master-signifier, which brings to the point the discursive production of 
surplus-being. Lacan takes as the crown example of this excess in the 
imperative function of the signifier Aristotle’s distinction between to ti esti, 
what is, and to ti en einai, what has to be: “It seems that the pedicle is 
conserved here that allows us to situate from whence this discourse on 
being is produced – it’s quite simply being at someone’s heel, being at 
someone’s beck and call – what would have been if you had understood 
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what I ordered you to do” (Lacan 1999, 31; see also Zupančič, 3). If it 
indeed makes sense to speak of a constitutive oblivion or repression in 
philosophy then these operations concern the excess of the signifier, and 
most particularly of the signifier “being” (that Lacan writes m’être, my 
being, in homophony with maître, master, thereby exposing the 
exploitative regime and the master’s appropriation of surplus-being in 
and through the discourse of ontology). The signifier “being” is the 
privileged marker of this oblivion and the persistence of the excess of the 
signifier behind the philosopher’s back. 
 The second feature of the signifier concerns its stupidity: “The 
signifier is stupid. It seems to me that this could lead to a smile, a stupid 
smile, naturally. A stupid smile, as everyone knows – it suffices to visit 
cathedrals – is an angel's smile. Indeed, that is the only justification for 
Pascal's warning. If an angel has such a stupid smile, that is because it is 
up to its ears in the supreme signifier” (Lacan 1999, 20). The mention of 
the angel’s smile as the ultimate metaphor of the signifier’s stupidity 
cannot but evoke Bernini’s statue of St. Theresa that Lacan comments in 
the same seminar. The saint’s mimic testifies of enjoyment caused in the 
body by the stupid signifier, a signifier that misses its reference, 
inadequate signifier, for which, again, the signifier “being” ultimately 
stands for. Being – the signifier of the stupidity of the signifier? Lacan 
addresses the constitutive inadequacy of the signifier in the following 
manner:  
 
Signified effects [effets de signifié] seem to have nothing to do with 
what causes them. That means that the references or things the 
signifier serves to approach remain approximate – macroscopic, 
for example. What is important is not that this is imaginary – after 
all, if the signifier allowed us to point to the image we need to be 
happy, that would be very good, but it’s not the case. At the level of 
the signifier/signified distinction, what characterizes the 
relationship between the signified and what serves as the 
indispensable third party, namely the referent, is precisely that the 
signified misses the referent. The joiner doesn't work (Lacan 1999, 
20; transl. modified).  
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As soon as this disfunctioning is recognised another Parmenidian axiom 
begins to crumble, the distinction of being and non-being: “It is precisely 
because he was a poet that Parmenides says what he has to say to us in 
the least stupid of manners. Otherwise, the idea that being is and that 
nonbeing is not, I don't know what that means to you, but personally I 
find that stupid. And you mustn't believe that it amuses me to say so” 
(Lacan 1999, 22). If Parmenides’ distinction is stupid it is because it is 
closely linked with the effort to stabilise being, to repress, as Zupančič 
writes, an “inbuilt negativity – negativity transmitted with the ‘positive’ 
order of being” (104). Only by opposing being to non-being can 
Parmenides conceive “being qua being” as a fully constituted, 
immovable and self-identical One, and thus provide the first 
metaphorical ontology on the background of the “prohibition of 
negativity”. This brings us back to the foundational ontological quarrel 
between Parmenides and Heraclitus, between absence of movement, or 
what Lacan calls l’êtrernel, eternal being, and movement, or what is 
considered the main invention of Heraclitus, becoming, instability of 
being.xi 
Finally, the third feature of the signifier evolves around the key 
problem of psychoanalysis, enjoyment, and concerns the definition of the 
signifier as its cause:  
 
The signifier is the cause of jouissance. Without the signifier, how 
could we even approach that part of the body? Without the 
signifier, how could we center that something that is the material 
cause of jouissance? However fuzzy or confused it may be, it is a 
part of the body that is signified in this contribution. Now I will go 
right to the final cause, final in every sense of the term because it is 
the terminus – the signifier is what brings jouissance to a halt. After 
those who embrace – if you'll allow me – alas! And after those who 
are weary, hold on there! The other pole of the signifier, its 
stopping action, is as much there at the origin as the 
commandment’s direct addressing can be (Lacan 1999, 24).  
 
The signifier produces with the same blow a disappointment (“alas!”) and 
an excess (“hold on there!”), too little and too much, lack-of-enjoyment 
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and surplus-enjoyment. This is what the formula of the master’s 
discourse, which not only covers ontology but summarises the logic of 
the signifier as such, brings to the point: on the upper level there is the 
chain of signifiers abbreviated in the couple S1–S2 and on the lower level 
the two products of the signifier in the living body: underneath the 
master-signifier the barred subject, subjectivation of the lack, and 
underneath the battery of the signifiers the object of enjoyment, the 
objectification of surplus. The same scheme between lack and surplus 
can be linked to the ontological question of being, and this is where the 
Parmenidian delimitation of being and non-being is rejected. Contrary to 
the simple opposition imposed by the “stupid” remark “what is, is, and 
what is not, is not” Lacan insists that the master’s discourse is marked by 
an internally doubled production of lack-of-being and surplus-being.xii 
 Looking back at the conflictual couple “Heraclitus-Parmenides” 
one could argue that the foundation has been laid for the opposition of 
metaphorical ontology and metonymical ontology, but also for a 
materialist ontological orientation, which strives to overcome the two by 
taking the function of the signifier seriously. Metaphorical ontology 
postulates the One as enclosed totality. It can only do so by anchoring 
the symbolic in the imaginary. This is one of the main reasons for Lacan’s 
scepticism toward the logic of metaphor: it presents the real as endowed 
with sense. In contrast, metonymic ontology postulates the One as 
virtually endless field of differences, the negative One conceived as 
disclosed multiplicity. This postulate is anchored in the autonomy of the 
symbolic. Lacan departed from the logic of metonymy but considered it 
insufficient. It tackles the issue of ontological incompleteness but does 
not reach beyond the register of the symbolic. Materialist ontology finally 
recognises the One in the grey zone between being and non-being. This 
is what Lacan’s saying yad’lun (there is something of One) aims at. 
Neither: “The One exists” (the claim of metaphorical ontology) nor: “The 
One does not exist” (the claim of metonymic ontology, which correlates 
with: “Multiplicity exists”), but there is an effect of Oneness, whose 
ontological constitution is incomplete.xiii This incompleteness does not 
imply that the One lacks something. The incompleteness is constitutive in 
the sense that it comes with a void in the midst of One. If I may again 
mobilise Heidegger here, lack operates on the ontic level, which is why it 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
What IS Sex? 
 
 104 
always comes in pair with the appearance of lack of something, whereas 
void (or hole, trou) operates on the ontological level, which is why its 
conceptualisation radicalises something that is already at stake on the 
level of the lack, its objective status. It should not come as a surprise that 
Lacan found the ultimate materialisation of the hole and yad’lun in the 
Borromean knot. 
With yad’lun Lacan could be said to affirm both features of 
Heraclitus’ materialism, becoming (“In the same river we enter and do 
not enter, we are and we are not”) and the signifier (“Have you not 
understood me but the word [logos] then it is wise and in accordance to 
logos [homologein] to say that everything is one”). Heraclitus introduced 
the notion of dynamic One, which overcomes the simple opposition of 
Structure and History. “Everything flows” (panta rei) and “Everything is 
one” (hen panta) describe two different and yet inseparable aspects of 
the same ontological reality, the One in the sense of yad’lun, whereby the 
first claim (panta rei) describes the diachronic and the second (hen 
panta) the synchronic aspect of the One. The One is marked by a 
parallax, which means, to put it somewhat paradoxically, that the One is 
whole only insofar as it is incomplete. This is the materialist outlook of 
Heraclitus’ ontology, in contrast to Parmenides’ static notion of the One 
and the metaphorical ontology it grounds. Lacan recognised in the 
notion of structure a paradigmatic example of such Becoming-One, split 
between mathematically formalizable relations and continuous historical 
dynamic, langage and lalangue, in which every ultimate differentiation of 
being and non-being becomes impossible. Structure stands for the 
becoming of logos, a logical and rational becoming. This is also why the 
topology of the One in Parmenides, the sphere, does not apply to 
Heraclitus. The flow of being, the ontological flux or becoming abolishes 
the spherical model. Its topological consistency would instead be that of 
Möbius strip, Klein bottle, cross-cap or the Borromean knot (Lacan’s 
“favourite” topological objects, whose materialist character he repeatedly 
accentuated). 
When speaking of materialism one irresistibly thinks of 
sensuousness, as if the mission of materialism would be to exorcise 
abstractions. Quite the contrary, materialism stands for a specific way of 
dealing with abstractions. From this perspective the conflict between 
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empiricism and dialectical materialism appears as conflict between 
(false) materialism without abstraction and (true) materialism with 
abstraction (examining the materiality of abstractions). This is also what 
Lacan’s inclusion of the signifier among material causes and his talk 
about real discursive consequences suggests. Matter must be conceived 
as gespenstige Gegenständigkeit, spectral objectivity, to put it again with 
Marx. Empiricism still builds on a fantasmatic ground, where materiality 
coincides with immediacy, while for dialectical materialism matter 
functions as category of mediation, abstraction. Or, this history reaches 
back to the Greek inauguration of materialist orientation in ontology. True 
materialism has less to do with the assumption that all beings are 
grounded in sensuous matter; instead consequent materialism always 
concerns the determination of an inner torsion of matter, conflictuality of 
matter. 
It would be false to assume that the Greek materialists were not 
preoccupied with abstract matter, even when they speak of sensuous 
phenomena like water, fire, atoms etc. Lacan, for whom the questions 
raised by ancient materialism were indeed crucial, repeatedly 
commented the Pre-Socratics, whereby one notices that all his 
commentaries are traversed by one particular thought, namely that 
materialism contains radical dissolution of the world of appearances, 
and brings about a homologous achievement to Platonism. 
Simultaneously, materialism performs an inversion of Platonism, since 
the abstraction that supposedly grounds the world of appearances is not 
considered static. Materialism thus aims at a real dynamic and negativity 
in being. This double orientation – ontological foundation and instability 
of being – does not only stand in contrast with Plato but even more so 
with Aristotle. Both philosophical rivals agree that the main task of the 
science of being qua being consisted in describing (or saving) the 
phenomena (sozein ta phainomena). In contrast to Plato’s realism of 
(mathematical and ideal) abstractions, Aristotle’s empiricism and 
logicism strives for a double normalisation: of the inner world (language 
and thought) and the outer world (nature and the real). The ancient 
materialists in this history do not play along, for they aim at the abstract 
materiality of negativity in being, which would later in the history of 
materialist ontology translate into the materiality of the void (Lucretius). 
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Lacan occasionally remarked that “to be a philosopher of nature 
never passed not even for a moment as certificate of materialism and 
also not of scientificity” (Lacan 2006, 33; see also Zupančič, 78). Pre-
Socratics such as Thales, Heraclitus, Democritus or Empedocles are 
normally described as philosophers of nature, because they take a 
natural substance as foundation of all beings and thus turn away from 
mythology. They seem to be materialists because they equate the being 
of beings with a sensuous elementary reality. They are not yet on the 
abstract level of Parmenides, who was the first one to conceive Being as 
abstraction and postulated its immovable character. This traditional 
reading misses a crucial point. The Pre-Socratic philosophers of nature 
make of the dynamic in being their main preoccupation. The flux of being 
is at the core of their materialist ontologies (water flows, fire burns, atoms 
fall, the conflict between philia and neikos introduces in nature dialectical 
movement etc.). The Pre-Socratic materialists therefore have a much 
more sophisticated concept of being that it may seem. On the one hand, 
being is hardly distinguishable from sensuousness, and on the other 
hand, its materiality contains something speculative, which Parmenides 
repressed when he founded philosophy on the imperative of delimiting 
being from non-being, as well as on the identity of thinking and being. By 
recognising the dynamic of being the Pre-Socratic philosophers of nature 
anchored their ontology in the grey zone, where being is mixed with non-
being, not yet being and no longer non-being. Their ontology thus 
consists less in asserting the sensuous character of being than in the 
dynamics of matter, or in the conception of materiality beyond the 
dichotomy of being and non-being. 
For Lacan, the difference between pre-modern and modern 
physics consists in the fact that the latter makes something with 
discourse: “Nature is there. What distinguishes it from physics, however, 
is that it is worth saying something about physics, namely that there 
discourse has consequences, whereas, as everyone knows, no 
discourse has any consequence in nature, and that is why one loves it so 
much” (Lacan 2006, 33; Zupančič, 78). The most problematic aspect of 
metaphorical ontology is its love of nature, which makes nature appear 
as harmoniously ordered whole, unproblematic reality, which is 
supposed to be simply there and which can be linguistically more or less 
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adequately described in human language. Aristotle, the paradigmatic 
example of metaphorical ontology, made of wonder (thaumazein) the 
origin of philosophy and considered the love of knowledge its driving 
force. Or, in Pre-Socratic philosophers of nature there seems to be no 
love, and because these materialists do not love nature, they can grasp 
in it something, which cannot be transformed into a love object. 
Materialism defetishises nature, again in contrast to Aristotle, who 
grounds his ontology and physics on an epistemic and political fetishism: 
the fetishisation of the (ontological) master, the immovable mover, 
whose ontic embodiment Aristotle believed to have found in the 
aristocrat (politics) and the philosopher (knowledge). 
In sharp contrast to the Aristotelian scenario, the materialist 
orientation in ontology implies a double thesis. First, the materiality of 
matter is paradoxical: too corporeal to be a separate immaterial 
substance and too nonsensical (in both meanings of “sense”) to overlap 
with empirical materiality or the phenomenal world. As Lacan remarked, 
“a body hasn’t seemed materialistic enough since Democritus” (Lacan 
1999, 71). In order to react to the problematic character of matter, one 
must introduce the atom. But what is an atom? In his common-sense 
empiricism, Aristotle falsely interpreted it as an elementary particle, the 
indivisible element of matter, stoicheion. But the materialistic orientation 
of ancient atomism lies elsewhere, namely in the conception of the atom 
as “element of flying signifierness” (ibid). The important thing about the 
atom is not its unity and immobility, but its difference and movement. In 
other words, the atom is not a metaphorical being or metaphor of being 
(the highest being, in which being would come to its fullness), but a 
metonymic being or metonymy of being (Fort-und-Da-Sein). With this 
ontological turn, philosophy is based on a conflict, which is more 
fundamental than “Plato against Aristotle”: Parmenides against 
Heraclitus, or on a conceptual level, the question of being against the 
problem of becoming. 
Secondly, a consistent materialist orientation must reflect the real 
of discourse and thus overcome the “Aristotelian” orientation (love) in 
ontological, epistemological and political matters. Here the second 
ontological thesis becomes palpable: the abstraction is conflictual and 
therefore dynamic. The dynamics of abstractions only becomes 
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thinkable when “natural being is defetishised and a dialectical-materialist 
perspective on abstraction is introduced in ontology.xiv 
 
From Lack to Hole 
 
In her work Zupančič draws attention to a crucial psychoanalytic 
contribution to the materialist ontology and spells out its implications for 
the contemporary renewal of materialist thought beyond the 
predominance of metonymic ontologies. This contribution involves the 
role of constitutive negativity and non-relation in being. The ontological 
status of the real in Lacanian sense (as well as of the unconscious and 
sexuality in the Freudian sense) is most problematic, and one should 
refrain from conflating it with a positive ontological reality or even 
recognise in it a new, specifically psychoanalytic name of being qua 
being. This is the trap that many contemporary psychoanalysts expose 
themselves, when they talk about the “real unconscious” in difference to 
the “transference unconscious” (one can mention notably Jacques-Alain 
Miller and Colette Soler). In contrast to such essentialist reading of the 
real (as well as of sexuality and the unconscious, insofar as they assume 
the status of real discursive consequences), Zupančič makes a case for a 
dialectical-materialist stance, which conceives the real as that in being 
(whether this being is natural or social), which malfunctions and 
moreover which is not of the order of being as it continues to be 
understood by the various philosophical ontologies. Materialist ontology 
would thus point toward a peculiar materiality of non-relation, which, 
however, needs to be situated correctly: 
 
The formulation “concrete constitutive negativity” requires further 
explanation. In general theoretical terms, we should say of this 
configuration: it is not that there is one fundamental non-relation 
and a multiplicity of different relations, determined by the former in 
a negative way. It is, rather, that every relationship also posits the 
concrete point of the impossible that determines it. It determines 
what will be determining it. In this sense we could say that all 
social relations are concretizations of the non-relation as universal 
determination of the discursive, which does not exist anywhere 
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outside these concrete (non-)relations. This also means that the 
non-relation is not the ultimate (ontological) foundation of the 
discursive, but its surface—it exists and manifests itself only 
through it. To put it differently: it is not that there is (and remains) a 
fundamental non-relation which will never be (re)solved by any 
concrete relation. Rather: every concrete relation de facto resolves 
the non-relation, but it can resolve it only by positing (“inventing”), 
together with itself, its own negativity, its own negative 
condition/impossibility. The non-relation is not something that 
“insists” and “remains,” but something that is repeated—something 
that “does not stop not being written” (to use Lacan’s expression). It 
is not something that resists all writing, and that no writing can 
actually write—it is inherent to writing, and repeats itself with it 
(146, note). 
 
The point is thus not that there are relations and underneath there is 
Non-Relation; rather non-relation is what traverses relationality from 
within. Paraphrasing Zupančič one could also say that every relation 
comes with “without relation”. It includes non-relation, which, due to this 
inclusion, cannot serve as the name of being qua being, but instead 
enunciates that being is neither One nor Multiple but non-all. No surprise, 
then, that Lacan associates the non-all both with the register of the 
symbolic (the field of language) and with the register of the real, while the 
marker “all” relates to the imaginary closure of being into One.  
Here it also becomes clear that the triad of metaphorical, 
metonymic and materialist ontology overlaps with the Lacanian triad of 
Imaginary, Symbolic and Real. The link between the closure, stabilisation 
and eternalisation of being (again, for what Lacan forged the neologism 
l’êtrernel), the logic of metaphor and the register of Imaginary would thus 
be specific for metaphorical ontologies, which work with the 
condensation of being in the highest of beings, the metaphysical figure 
of One. The link between disclosure, metonymisation and 
temporalisation of being, between the logic of metonymy and the register 
of Symbolic is characteristic for metonymic ontologies, which work with 
the displacement of being in the system of differences. Finally there is a 
complication in the link between materialist ontology and the real, since 
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Lacan defines the real with three negative features: foreclosure of sense 
(non-sense), absence of law (instability) and incompleteness (non-all). 
Because the real dissolves every appearance of substantiality, 
consistency and closure it stands for a non-register rather than for a 
register. Hence, the real for Lacan appears in the form of a knot, where it 
is redoubled on the third ring of the Borromean link (or relation) and the 
real of the knot (which is precisely non-relation). The Borromean knot is 
both: non-relational relation and relational non-relation, continuity or, 
better, inseparability of relation and non-relation. The knot, Lacan final 
topological exemplification of what is at stake in his materialist ontology, 
brings the paradoxical status of the real to the point: it cannot be pinned 
down neither to one of the rings in the knot (which is, to be sure, a 
pseudo-knot, since the three rings do not intersect, but are entirely 
independent and interchangeable) nor to the knot as a whole (since the 
knot as a whole is precisely not a figure of the Whole but a figure of 
yad’lun).xv  
In the psychoanalytic contribution to the materialist ontology the 
lack plays a crucial role, insofar as it is that which sustains the 
consistency of language, even in the most banal expression that it is the 
absence, the lack of a signifier that drives the dynamic of language and 
the movement of speech. This is how Zupančič reinterprets the peculiar 
“centrality” of the lack in Lacan’s ontology: 
 
This emphasis allows us to say not only that the signifying order is 
inconsistent and incomplete, but, in a stronger and more 
paradoxical phrasing, that the signifying order emerges as already 
lacking one signifier, that it appears with the lack of a signifier “built 
into it,” so to speak (a signifier which, if it existed, would be the 
“binary signifier”). In this precise sense the signifying order could 
be said to begin, not with One (nor with multiplicity), but with a 
“minus one” (…) We could also say: The emergence of the 
signifying order directly coincides with the non-emergence of one 
signifier, and this fact (this original minus one) leaves its trace in a 
particular feature/disturbance of the signifying system – 
enjoyment. So it is not so much that the signifier “produces” this 
surplus as that this surplus is the way in which the lack of the 
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(binary) signifier exists within the discursive structure and marks it 
in certain determinable ways. It marks (and thus effectively 
“curves”) it by sticking to a certain set (or chain) of other signifiers 
that relate in some way to this lack of the signifier. The way 
enjoyment relates to (or is linked to) the signifying order passes 
through what is missing in this order; it does not relate to it directly, 
but via its constitutive negativity (a minus one). This negativity is 
the Real of the junction between the (missing) signifier and 
enjoyment; and the conceptual name for this configuration in 
psychoanalysis is sexuality (or the sexual). Sexuality is coextensive 
with the effect of the signifying gap, at the place of which surplus-
enjoyment emerges, on the rest of the signifying chain (including 
bodily erogenous zones which are certainly not independent of the 
signifying grid) (Zupančič 2017, 42). 
 
This sharp materialist description of the ontological status of the lack 
should be contrasted to two other ways of dealing with the problematic, 
so that the three ways can again be associated to the triad of 
metaphorical, metonymic and materialist ontology. Metaphorical 
ontology would consist in minimisation, if not overall neutralisation or 
exclusion of the ontological efficiency of the lack. The highest being, the 
being of beings then appears as the ultimate point of the fullness of 
being, the metaphor of closed and fully constituted, immovable One, 
condensation of being. This does not come as surprise, since lack and 
void have always been associated with movement, even recognised as 
its cause. On the level of being qua being there cannot be any 
movement, since this would already signal ontological instability, an 
inmixing of non-being into being. 
If metaphorical ontology postulates being without negativity or 
being without lack, then metonymic ontology inverts the perspective and 
recognises in lack an essential feature of reality, which drives its 
movement, even recognises in lack a negative figure of being qua being. 
Reality is pure multiplicity, hence a system of differences, structured 
nothingness. Lack is here conceived as the privileged dynamic, 
something that shifts, say, along the chain of signifiers. It seems that 
Lacan occasionally comes suspiciously close to this position. But the 
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crucial difference is that metonymic ontology conceives lack only in 
relation to the symbolic, and to its positive correlate, the missing object. 
In other words, lack is here precisely lack of something (lack of object), 
and not yet lack of nothing (or lack of the signifier).  
This is where the ontological and topological difference between 
lack and void (or hole) becomes crucial – and is indeed something that 
delimits metonymic ontology from materialist ontology. If lack can still be 
related to some positive “something” and could thus potentially be filled, 
even if merely by fiction or fantasy, then the radical character of Lacan’s 
remark that the Other contains a hole is not yet fully grasped. Lack still 
implies an empty place, which can be occupied by an object, which 
veils, or mystifies, as Marx would put it, the radical implication of the lack, 
namely the void, which stands for the abolition of the logic of places 
altogether. The shift from lack to hole that Lacan initiates in the late 
1960’s and accomplishes by the time he introduces the Borromean knot 
(in Seminar XIX, which is at the core of Zupančič’s argumentation), is a 
shift from the symbolic to the real of the symbolic. Lack is not yet the real 
of the symbolic, but a fictionalisation of the hole in the Other. 
Consequently, the move from lack to hole (or void) involves a shift in the 
conception of the autonomy of the symbolic: from structural 
performativity (discursive materialism) to structural impossibility 
(dialectical materialism).  
The “with without” logic is fully recognised in its real (and not 
merely in its symbolic performative) consequences when it becomes 
clear that, for Lacan, things do not stop at lack – which implies an 
insufficient topology, that of the chain – but introduces the ontologically 
more fundamental and radical problematic of the hole, which 
necessitates the reference to topological objects such as the Möbius 
strip, Klein bottle, and finally the Borromean knot. While metonymic 
ontologies present the void in the mystified form of lack, which sustains 
its fetishisation in terms of lack of an object, Lacan’s materialist ontology 
mobilises an entire topological apparatus in order to demonstrate what is 
at stake in the difference between lack and void, and expose the non-
relation between the symbolic and the real (including the real of the 
symbolic, which means that Lacan’s structuralism ultimately engages 
with the non-relation of the symbolic with its own real). Zupančič’s point 
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concerning the logic of “with-without” aims less at the postulation of 
place, which could be filled by an object, even if such filling ultimately 
fails (since the lack is displaced), but rather at the void as the privileged 
entry point in the unstable consistency and inexistence of the Other. This 
is also why Lacan in his later phase no longer described the “signifier of 
the barred Other” as a signifier of lack (that would be the return to 
metonymy) but as a signifier of hole and of ex-sistence (the ontological 
category aiming at the grey zone between existence and inexistence in 
traditional sense) of the Other. The structure and the topological 
consistency of the Other (Lacan eventually equated topology with 
structure; see Lacan 2001, 483) is sustained by the hole (like in the case 
of Klein bottle that Lacan occasionally uses for modelling the real of 
structure). The fact that the Other lacks a signifier thus fundamentally 
concerns the ontological problematic of the void, since the issue for 
Lacan is not in finding the missing signifier (lack is not preceded by a 
signifier that went lost) but in thinking the ontological implications of the 
emergence of language, the fact that at some point semblances in 
nature accumulated, i.e., articulated around a hole, which is nothing 
other than the hole of primary repression: 
 
[T]he human (hi)story begins not with the emergence of the 
signifier, but with one signifier “gone missing.” We could indeed 
say that nature is already full of signifiers (and at the same time 
indifferent to them); and that at some point one signifier “falls out,” 
goes missing. And it is only from this that the “logic of the signifier” 
in the strict sense of the term is born (signifiers start to “run,” and to 
relate to each other, across this gap). In this sense, and from this 
perspective, speech itself is already a response to the missing 
signifier, which is not (there). Speech is not simply “composed of 
signifiers,” signifiers are not the (sufficient) condition of speech, the 
condition of speech as we know it is “one-signifier-less.” 
Humans are beings roused from indifference and forced to speak 
(as well as to enjoy, since enjoyment appears at the place of this 
deficit) by one signifier gone missing. This temporal way of putting 
it (“gone missing”) is an expression of what would be better 
formulated as the signifying structure emerging not simply without 
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one signifier, but rather with-without one signifier— since this 
“hole” has consequences, and determines what gets structured 
around it (47). 
 
Perhaps one could also say that what lacks the symbolic is the signifier 
of the ontological scandal of the symbolic order, a signifier, which, if it 
existed, would establish an uncorrupted relation between natural 
semblances and linguistic semblances or, what is more likely, abolish 
language. The loss, which is constitutive for the emergence of language 
or for the “transcendence of matter into language”, is an act of 
production of a signifier, which functions only insofar as it dysfunctions or 
the functioning of which is disfunctioning. The One of the symbolic does 
not exist, and this inexistence, or ex-sistence, makes of language the 
paradigmatic example of incomplete ontological constitution, which, 
however, enables thinking to encounter a real that is not the real of 
language: to life sciences it enables to encounter and to mobilise the 
incomplete ontological constitution of the phenomena of life and to 
natural sciences like physics it enables to encounter and to mobilise the 
incomplete ontological constitution of material reality. According to 
Zupančič the task of dialectical materialism consists in thinking these 
encounters: “The true materialism, which […] can only be a dialectical 
materialism, is not grounded in the primacy of matter nor in matter as 
first principle, but in the notion of conflict or contradiction, of split, and of 
the ‘parallax of the Real’ produced in it. In other words, the fundamental 
axiom of materialism is not ‘matter is all’ or ‘matter is primary,’ but relates 
rather to the primacy of a cut” (77). This primacy of the cut explains why 
dialectical-materialist thinking is never merely thinking but already 
involves action, praxis. Indeed, discourse has consequences, and 
nothing proves this discursive feature better than psychoanalysis. 
 
 
i See Heidegger 1976, 313. For a philosophical account of Lacan’s relation to Heidegger, 
see Balmes 2002. 
ii It is worth recalling that Lacan extensively discussed mimicry in his Seminar XI, which 
is no less relevant for the issue of primitive accumulation of semblances. See Lacan 
1998, 73-74, 98-100. 
                                                        
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
What IS Sex? 
 
 115 
                                                                                                                                                              
iii Elsewhere Lacan speaks of essaim (swarm, homophony with S1), which concerns both 
the question of primitive accumulation of semblances and Zupančič’s discussion of 
Lacan’s ontological statement yad’l’un: “What does There is something of One mean? 
From one-among-others, and the point is to know whether it is any at all, arises an S1, a 
signifying swarm [essaim signifiant], a buzzing swarm. If I raise the question, Is it of 
them-two that I am speaking?, I will write this S1 of each signifier, first on the basis of its 
relation to S2. And you can add as many of them as you like. This is the swarm I am 
talking about: S1(S1(S1(S1 → S2))))” (Lacan 1999, 143, transl. modified). 
iv All subsequent references to Zupančič’s What Is Sex? will be indicated only with 
pagination in brackets. 
v For Lacan, structure contains a “convergence towards an impossibility” (Lacan 2006, 
30) and is ultimately unthinkable without instability. One could equally say that 
language becomes most real in the points of its breakdown or malfunctioning. No 
surprise, then, that Roman Jakobson (1969, 15) insisted that the science of language 
should study language from its extreme points, its generation or becoming in child 
language and its corruption or dissolution in aphasic disorders. The status of linguistic 
malfunctions, structural instabilities, deadlocks and contradictions differs from the 
performative effects of language that have been popular at the peak of various linguistic 
turns in philosophy. In its examination of the real of language psychoanalysis indeed 
made an original contribution to ontological debates, which has been only partially 
highlighted until Zupančič’s intervention. 
vi For the simple reason that the signifier behaves in relation to natural semblances just 
like “the Animal” in Marx’s description of what the emergence of the general equivalent 
implies for the products of human labour. See Žižek 2012, 410, and my own account in 
Tomšič 2015, 179-180. 
vii This is also one of the points of Lacan’s delimitation from nominalism that Zupančič 
(43) brings into the game.  
viii Again the confusion between being (Sein) and beings (Seiendes), the misconception 
of being in terms of the highest of beings: One, God, Idea, Matter, Substance, etc. 
ix With all the ambiguity of the term: that production of being is stained by enjoyment, 
which is not quite being, or that being is what is enjoyed, consumed, as object of 
enjoyment, by the master’s discourse, and that the entire “creation” works, i.e., produces 
surplus-being for the ontological master. The discourse of ontology is always-already a 
social mode of production. 
x Contemporary “materialist” ontologies touch upon metaphorical ontologies in their 
assumption that they must exclude the subject and normalise language in order to 
reach the uncorrupted and absolute order of being, in other words in order to make the 
world of objects consistent with itself. But what is a subject? Precisely an object, which 
assumes a double status among objects – it is part of the “order of things”, but it is part 
of this order only under the condition that it is brought into its problematic existence by 
the signifier. The subject thus assumes a symptomatic status in the world of objects. It is 
an ontological symptom, so to speak, a symptom that the order of being is 
contaminated by negativity. 
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xi Becoming is less a noun than a verb, action rather than state, and it is here that the 
limit of the stupidity of the signifier can be detected: “One could even say that the verb is 
defined as a signifier that is not as stupid – you have to write that as one word – 
notasstupid as the others, no doubt, providing as it does the movement of a subject to 
his own division in jouissance, and it is all the less stupid when the verb determines this 
division as disjunction, and it becomes a sign” (Lacan 1999, 25). It becomes a sign, i.e., a 
symptom, in which the removed negativity in being returns in the guise of an 
“ontological slip”, a slip inscribed in “being qua being”.  
xii Could one not see in this redoubling a reformulation of the “ontological difference”: the 
ontic order of beings is always marked by a certain lack-of-being, a diminished intensity 
of being, whereas the order of being (here understood as the highest of beings) is 
marked not simply by the fullness of being but – in relation to the ontic order of beings 
that it grounds – rather by an excess of being, “too much” being. 
xiii For the discussion of yad’lun, see Zupančič 2017, 125-126. 
xiv The situation complicates in modernity, because capitalism introduces a new dialectic 
of fetishism, which extends from the commodity world to the financial world. If a 
disenchantment of the “closed world” took place in modernity, a spectralisation of the 
“infinite universe” also occurred. There is an explosion of fetishisation in modernity, 
which makes of every being a fetish, an embodiment of value and a potential source of 
surplus value. In this respect there was no disenchantment of the world. The planet is 
devastated because of intensified fetishisation of value, this specifically capitalist “love 
for nature”, which can love only under the condition that it mutilates (exploits, 
commodifies) the object of love. 
xv Lacan eventually abandoned the term “antiphilosophy” and instead spoke of his 
Borromean knot as the foundation of a “new”, materialist philosophy: “It’s not terribly 
easy to support wisdom otherwise than through writing, the writing of the Node Bo, 
such that all in all, please excuse my infatuation, what I’ve been trying to do with my 
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